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Effective and Constitutional: Goals for a Hurricane
Response Plan in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita
NEAL MCHENRY*
INTRODUCTION

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall.1 It devastated the Gulf Coast
region more than any storm before it. To make matters worse, Hurricane Rita followed
on September 18,2 delaying response efforts and wreaking even more havoc on the
Gulf Coast. In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, local governments and
national emergency response organizations like the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) were overwhelmed. Because of the scope of the hurricanes, the
government could not adequately meet the needs of the victims; and private groups,
including religious organizations, helped fill the void left by the government.
On September 25, 2005, FEMA announced that it would reimburse religious and
secular groups that had contributed to the relief effort by sheltering and providing
necessities to evacuees. 3 Many citizens approved of this measure because of the
important role religious organizations played in providing relief after the massive
devastation of the storms, but others argued that the plan was a violation of the
Establishment Clause.4 Those opponents claimed that the reimbursements5 were going
to go to constitutionally impermissible activities that advanced religion.
The purpose of this Note is to recommend a disaster response plan that is as
effective as possible without violating Establishment Clause principles implicated
when the government directly aids religious organizations. Keeping these principles in
mind, Part I discusses the role of religious organizations in the response to the
hurricanes and highlights the importance of incorporating religious organizations in
any hurricane response structure to provide the most effective possible relief Part II
then uses relevant Supreme Court cases to outline Establishment Clause issues that
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1. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE BIPARTISAN
COMMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 7
(Comm. Print 2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf
[hereinafter FAILURE OF INITIATIVE].
2. RICHARD D. KNABB, DANIEL P. BROWN & JAMIE R. RHOME, NAT'L HURRICANE CTR.,
TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE RITA 1 (2006), availableat
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-ALI 82005 Rita.pdf.

3. See Alan Cooperman & Elizabeth Williamson, FEMA Plans to Reimburse Faith
GroupsforAid, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2005, at Al, availableat
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/26/AR2005092601799.html.

4. Brian C. Ryckman, Comment, Indoctrinatingthe Gulf Coast: The FederalResponse to
HurricanesKatrinaandRita andthe EstablishmentClauseof the FirstAmendment, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 929, 930 (2007).
5. See Cooperman & Williamson, supra note 3.
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arise when religious organizations receive direct government funding. This Part goes
on to discuss how the Supreme Court standard has been applied to other Establishment
Clause challenges in lower courts. Part III evaluates the potential success of an
Establishment Clause challenge to FEMA's current reimbursement plan. Part IV closes
the analysis with a discussion of some alternatives to the reimbursement plan. This
Note concludes with the proposition that the best plan for an effective and
constitutional response is one that incorporates religious organizations into the relief
framework while providing them with guidelines and supervision on how to
constitutionally use government funds.
I. CRISIS AND RECOVERY: THE ROLE OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE

HURRICANE RELIEF EFFORTS AND THE NECESSITY OF UTILIZING THESE
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FUTURE

FEMA and the Red Cross (to a lesser extent) were subjected to heavy criticism in
the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.6 Their ability to allocate resources and
coordinate relief efforts were not up to the challenge of the disaster before them.7
However, national religious organizations like Catholic Charities and local faith-based
organizations were largely praised for their role in the relief efforts.8
The Red Cross often fell short of expectations and many times it had to call on local
charities to fill the void left by FEMA and Red Cross relief efforts. In Shreveport,
Louisiana, the Red Cross asked local churches to take over a shelter that ended up
having 6200 people pass through its doors. 9 Over 7000 hurricane victims were cared
for and sometimes housed by local churches in Birmingham, Alabama.10 The Red
Cross had five shelters open in the Baton Rouge area, but there were also seventy nonRed Cross shelters, primarily run by faith-based organizations, opened in the area that
were "hugely important" to the "community's capacity to absorb the volume of
displaced people that it did."" When the Red Cross was incapable of providing the
necessary assistance or when the Red Cross asked faith-based groups for help,
community organizations and churches stepped in and did all they could to help
hurricane victims.
Local faith-based charities were also crucial to relief efforts in areas in which the
Red Cross and FEMA refused to operate because of concerns with high winds or

6. See Tony Pipa, Weathering the Storm: The Role ofLocal Nonprofits in the Hurricane
KatrinaRelief Effort 10 (Aspen Inst., Working Paper, 2006), availableat
http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/usr-doc/Nonprofits andKatrina.pdf.
7. FArLuRE OF INTLTIVE, supra note 1, at 158, 343.
8. See Pipa,supranote 6, at 11.
9. To Review the Response by Charities to HurricaneKatrina: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 10 (2005)

(statement of Rep. Jim McCrery), availableat
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=4682 [hereinafter Response
by Charities].

10. Id. at 25 (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director, Education, Workforce
and Income Security, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
11. Id. at 41 (statement of John G. Davies, President and Chief Executive Officer, Baton
Rouge Area Foundation).

2009]

HURRICANE RESPONSE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

1427

flooding. 12 Red Cross policies kept the organization from operating in unsafe areas, but
there were still victims who needed assistance in these places.' 3 Charities, often local
churches, provided much-needed relief services in these dangerous areas. 14 These
local, faith-based charities proved invaluable in supplementing Red Cross services in
areas inundated with hurricane victims and areas where the Red Cross feared to tread.
Local religious organizations were able to immediately and efficiently respond to
the needs of the community with what little resources they had.'5 Unfortunately, FEMA
and the Red Cross were unprepared to utilize these organizations properly. 6 As a
result, local charities were frustrated by a lack of coordination or clear guidance from
FEMA or the Red Cross.17 The Red Cross was often unaware of what was happening at
the local level among different charitable organizations.18 Leaders of local charities felt
there was "no significant awareness among local organizations of what the national
organizations were doing, and vice versa."' 19 Red Cross officials even acknowledged
the shortcomings in communication with local charities and noted the importance of
20
improving input mechanism from local charities.
A pre-defmed system of coordination would help local charities know and
understand their expected role in disasters and would help FEMA and the Red Cross
properly utilize these organizations. 21 The Red Cross and FEMA can take a lesson
from the structure of Catholic Charities. Although it is a national organization, Catholic
Charities works through local Catholic organizations to meet the needs of the
community.22 Since its primary organization is at the local level, Catholic Charities was
more able to stay "responsive and flexible" to the needs of the community. 23 When a
new problem arose in a particular area, the local
chapter was able to refocus its efforts
24
without disrupting other chapters' operations.

12. Id. at 25 (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director, Education, Workforce
and Income Security, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id.
15. See Pipa, supranote 6, at 8.
16. See FAILURE OF INrnArIVE, supra note 1, at 350 (quoting Louisiana Representative Jim
McCrery's condemnation of the Red Cross's failure to offer adequate assistance to local
independent shelters set up by churches); see also Pipa, supra note 6, at 11.
17. See Pipa, supra note 6, at 15.
18. See, e.g., Response by Charities,supra note 9, at 11 (statement of Rep. Jim McCrery).
19. Id. at 40 (statement of John G. Davies, President and Chief Executive Officer, Baton
Rouge Area Foundation).
20. Id. at 33 (statement of Joseph C. Becker, Senior Vice President, Preparedness and
Response, American Red Cross).
21. See Pipa, supra note 6, at 20 (recommending the development of a "high-level

coordinating capability [that is] seamlessly able to integrate a multiplicity of [charitable]
organizations delivering a stratified response").
22. FAILURE OF INiTiATIVE, supra note 1, at 353.

23. Jennifer Seidenberg, Cultural Competency in Disaster Recovery: Lessons Learned from
the Hurricane Katrina Experience for Better Serving Marginalized Communities 21 (Spring
2006) (unpublished student paper, University of California-Berkeley), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/disasters/Seidenberg.pdf.
24. See id.
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FEMA recognized that help from local volunteer agencies substantially augmented
its relief efforts in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 25 Acknowledging this
reality, FEMA needs to take the next step by instituting reforms to help coordinate
these local organizations. If FEMA creates a coordinated superstructure that integrates
local charities into an overall disaster response plan, it can avoid much of the needless
death and suffering caused by inefficiency. 26 The need to incorporate religious
institutions into disaster relief is clear; the question remaining is how to do this
effectively without trampling Establishment Clause principles.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE STANDARD FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

The standard used by the Supreme Court when dealing with direct government
funding to religious organizations is controlled by Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Mitchell v. Helms.27 O'Connor's standard focuses on actual prevention of
diverting government aid to religious purposes, and this standard has been applied by
lower courts. 28 When reviewing direct funding cases, the Supreme Court uses a
modified version of the test set up in Lemon v. Kurtzman.29 The three-part test in
Lemon applied to challenges of government activities requires that, "[f]irst, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster 'an
30
excessive government entanglement with religion.'
In Agostini v. Felton, the Court folded the excessive entanglement inquiry into the
effect prong, so that now only the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test must be
considered when dealing with direct government funding of religious organizations. 31
The purpose prong is not in question in any of the following cases, and most of the
Court's analysis is focused on ensuring that the government aid does not have the
effect of promoting religion.3 2 Therefore, this Part will first discuss the current
Supreme Court standard for considering the effect of direct government aid to religious
organizations. Subpart B will discuss the possible impact of the new members of the
Court on the current standard. Subpart C will then look at how lower courts have
applied the standard to recent cases.

25. See Pipa, supra note 6, at 17 (quoting News Release, FEMA, Volunteer Agencies
Essential to Hurricane Response: Help for Louisiana Communities Came from Across the
Nation
and
World
(Mar.
13,
2006),
available
at
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2416 1).
26. Cf FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 2.
27. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).

28. Id. at 836-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29.
30.
31.
32.
(1988).

403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).
See Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793; Agostini, 521 U.S. 203; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
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A. DirectFundingEstablishment ClauseStandard: The Effect Prong
The current Establishment Clause standard for direct government funding of
religious organizations does not allow such funds to be diverted to religious purposes,
to foster excessive entanglement between the government and a religious organization,
or to end up in the coffers of pervasively sectarian institutions.33 The current Supreme
Court standard for the government directly funding religious organizations is
controlled by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Mitchell v. Helms.34 However,
there is a four-judge plurality adopting a different approach to direct funding
questions.35
Mitchell arose as a challenge to a state and federal program that lent educational
materials to public and private schools. 36 The challengers objected to the government
giving materials directly to parochial schools on Establishment Clause grounds.37 The
four-judge plurality upheld the direct government grants partially because the materials
were neutrally available to public and private, non-religious and religious schools
alike. 38 The plurality also held that since the money was distributed based on
enrollment, the government funds were disseminated based on the private choices of
citizens,39 and thus equated the program to one of true private choice.40
O'Connor's concurring opinion (joined by Justice Breyer) upholding the program
gave the plurality the deciding votes, so her opinion is controlling on the issue.4' She
agreed with the outcome the majority reached, but felt that they placed too much
emphasis on neutrality without worrying about how the government aid is used.42 She
also found the distinction between true private choice and the per capita aid program
important for purposes of endorsement and treated the case as a direct aid case,
subjecting the program to more scrutiny than if the aid were indirect.43 Her main

33. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 801-36 (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 801.
37. Id. at 803-04.
38. See id. at 830 ("The program makes a broad array of schools eligible for aid without
regard to their religious affiliations or lack thereof. We therefore have no difficulty concluding
that [the challenged program] is neutral .....
39. See id.
40. A true private choice program is one where money is distributed directly to private
citizens, who then choose how to use it. Id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring). An example
would be the voucher program approved by the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 536 U.S.
639 (2002). In that case, the government gave parents vouchers, which the parents could use to
send their children to any school, including religious schools. Id at 645. Classifying something
as a true private choice is significant for Establishment Clause purposes because when the
money is coming from private citizens the Court has not been nearly as concerned with
government advancement or endorsement of religion, and thus such programs have a much
easier time passing Supreme Court scrutiny than direct grant programs.
41. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 837.
43. Id. at 842.
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emphasis was ensuring that no government grants be used to advance religious
objectives. 44
Both opinions in Mitchell, and other cases dealing with direct funding, can be
distilled into a number of different considerations. In cases where the government
directly funds religious organizations, the focus for the effect prong should be on four
factors: (1) the divertability of the aid to religious purposes, (2) whether the aid was
supplemental to the core function of the grantee, (3) whether the organization receiving
the aid is pervasively sectarian, and (4) whether the aid fosters excessive entanglement
between the government and the religious organization. 5
1. Divertability of Government Aid to Religious Purposes
Under the current Supreme Court standard, government aid must be secular and
cannot be diverted to religious uses. Diversion of government aid to religious use was
one of the main points of contention between the plurality opinion and the concurring
opinion in Mitchell.46 While all Justices agreed that the content of the aid had to be
secular,47 the plurality was unconcerned with how the aid was used once it was granted
to religious organizations. 48 The plurality even indicated that they would approve direct
monetary grants to pervasively sectarian groups as long as the grants were neutrally
available and met the plurality's required private choice principles. 49 This statement
has important implications because money is fungible and therefore could be used to
purchase anything, including religious materials or programs.
In contrast, the concurrence found it constitutionally troubling if religious
organizations diverted secular aid to religious purposes.50 O'Connor required that
secular aid not be diverted to religious use, but placed the burden on plaintiff to prove
that the aid was actually being "used for religious purposes.",51 As long as the
government and the religious organizations had constitutionally sufficient safeguards
and monitoring in place to guard against the danger of divertability, the program was
presumed to be constitutional unless the plaintiff could prove otherwise.52 However,
the concurring opinion's emphasis on the safeguards indicates that the presumption of
53
constitutionality would be lost if there were not adequate safeguards in place.
O'Connor scrutinized the program's safeguards to make sure they were constitutionally
sufficient to ensure that aid was not being diverted to religious use. 4 Diversion was

44. See id. at 844.
45. See, e.g., id.;
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589 (1988).
46. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840.
47. See id.at 822 (plurality opinion) (noting both the plurality's and concurrence's
requirement that aid be secular); id.
at 867 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
48. See id.
at 822 (plurality opinion).
49. See id.
at 819 n.8 ("[lit ishard to seethe basis for deciding... differently simply if the
State had sent the tuition check directly to whichever school [the student] chose to attend.").
50. Id. at 857 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 861.
53. See id.
54. See id.
at 861-66.
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O'Connor's main point of emphasis in Mitchell, but other factors are
generally
55
considered under the effect prong when examining a direct aid program.
2. Aid Must Be Supplemental
The Supreme Court has considered it important that the government aid is
supplemental when approving direct aid programs. By supplemental, the Court means
that the aid does not supplant the costs the religious groups otherwise would have
borne.56 The idea behind requiring that the aid be supplemental is to ensure that the
government is not helping the school achieve a religious objective. Because the aid
provided in Agostini and Mitchell was supplemental to the regular curricula of the
religious schools, the Court did not find the aid constitutionally troubling. 7 In both
cases, the Court also found that the aid could be easily separated from the religious
functions of the school.58 The requirement that government aid not be used to supplant
costs that religious organizations otherwise would have borne goes hand-in-hand with
the diversion requirement. Both are aimed at preventing government money from
directly funding religious activities or instruction.
3. Religiously Affiliated Versus Pervasively Sectarian
Because O'Connor's controlling opinion in Mitchell is relatively silent on the issue
of pervasively sectarian organizations receiving direct money grants, the constitutional
standard is somewhat murky. However, Agostini, and even the plurality opinion in
Mitchell, make clear that this is still a special situation that will receive additional
59
scrutiny because of the relative ease that money can be diverted to religious purposes.
Pervasively sectarian institutions, as opposed to religiously affiliated institutions, are
thought to have environments "in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial
portion of [their] functions are subsumed in the religious mission .... 60 Religiously
affiliated organizations are groups like colleges, charities, or hospitals with religious
ties, 6t while parochial schools and churches are examples of pervasively sectarian
groups. In Bowen, the Court considered whether a group was pervasively sectarian, a
relevant factor in determining the constitutionality of a direct aid program.6 2 The
presumption was that if direct government aid went to pervasively sectarian
institutions, "there is a risk that direct government funding, even if designated for

55. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,228, 233-34 (1997).
56. Id. at 228.
57. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 860; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228.
58. In Agostini, the aid was remedial instruction provided by public school teachers on
parochial school grounds. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 211. In Mitchell, the aid was secular
instructional materials that the government lent to parochial schools. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 848.
59. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 818-19; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228.

60. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,610 (1988) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
743 (1973)).
61. DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSEs 207 (2d ed. 2009).
62. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610.

1432

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 84:1425

specific secular purposes, may63nonetheless advance the pervasively sectarian
institution's 'religious mission."'
However, in Agostini, the Court did away with the presumption that because a
teacher taught in a parochial school, the pervasively sectarian nature of her
surroundings would influence the teacher to promote religion. 64 Instead, the Court
assumed that a public school teacher would be able to execute her secular teachings
properly unless there was evidence to the contrary. 65 The one context in which
pervasively sectarian schools might still be treated differently than religiously affiliated
institutions is when the Court considers direct monetary grants. 66 The Court has
permitted direct money grants to religiously affiliated institutions as long as the money
is restricted to secular use, 67 but the Court has yet to allow direct money grants to
pervasively sectarian groups.
In Agostini, the Court found it important to note that no government funds ever
"reach[ed] the coffers of religious schools." 68 The plurality in Mitchell also
acknowledged special dangers when money was given directly to pervasively sectarian
organizations, although it indicated that the per capita assignment of money might be
enough to protect against those dangers. 69 O'Connor did not deal with the issue of
monetary grants in her opinion, possibly because the grant in Mitchell was of
educational materials, or perhaps because she was not as concerned with that portion of
the plurality's opinion. Her opinion sheds little light on the issue, but it is safe to
assume that a case involving direct grants to pervasively sectarian institutions would
receive special scrutiny from the Court since money is so easily diverted to religious
use.
4. Excessive Entanglement Between the Government and Religious Organizations
The Supreme Court will not find excessive entanglement between the government
and religious organizations unless there is a pervasive monitoring or administrative
system in place, such that the government will interfere with the day-to-day functions
of the religious organization. Excessive entanglement, based upon the Supreme Court's
most recent cases dealing with direct aid, "is confined to extreme institutional
entanglement., 70 "Routine administrative cooperation and governmental monitoring
are no longer regarded as problematic" when dealing with excessive entanglement
inquiries.7'
In Bowen, the Court pointed out that to claim that monitoring and administering a
government grant program to religious organizations creates excessive entanglement
between church and state forces the government into a Catch-22.72 If the government

63. Id. (citing Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
64. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223.
65. Id.
at 224.
66. CONKLE, supranote 61, at 207.
67. Id.
68. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228.
69. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 818-19 n.8 (2000) (plurality opinion).
70. CONKLE, supranote 61, at 205.
71. Id.
72. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988).

2009]

HURRICANE RESPONSE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

1433

does not monitor the grants, it fails Establishment Clause scrutiny in its duty to ensure
the aid is not diverted to religious purposes, but if the government does monitor the
grants, it fails the excessive entanglement prong. 73 Because of this Catch-22 and
because the monitoring in Bowen did not interfere with the day-to-day operation of the
religious organization, the Court held that the monitoring program at issue in Bowen
did not amount to excessive entanglement.74 Similarly, the Court inAgostinifound that
there was no excessive entanglement violation if the religious organization and the
government had some administrative cooperation and the government had some7level
5
of monitoring over the application of the grant, as long as it was not pervasive.
B. The New Court and the Futureof Mitchell
With O'Connor's retirement and the appointment of two new Justices, many are
questioning how long O'Connor's opinion will remain controlling. However, a recent
76
Establishment Clause case, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.,
indicates that the new conservative Justices may not be as willing as Scalia and
Thomas to overrule Establishment Clause precedent. O'Connor's recent retirement and
President Bush's conservative appointments leave the security of the Mitchell opinion
in doubt. Since O'Connor was a swing vote in the Mitchell case, if both of the new
Justices agree with the Mitchell plurality, this outcome could have a considerable
impact on the standard for direct funding.
Alito and Roberts have not weighed in on the specific issue of direct funding of
religious organizations, but Alito's Supreme Court confirmation hearings brought
attention to some of his conservative viewpoints on issues such as abortion 77 and
affirmative action. 78 Roberts is similarly expected to side with conservative Justices on
many issues. 7 9 However, there is no way to tell the impact of the new appointees on the
Mitchell precedent until the new Court rules on an Establishment Clause case dealing
with direct government funding of religious organizations.
In 2007, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., provided a first
opportunity for the new Court to deal with an Establishment Clause case. 80 The
plaintiffs challenged Congress's allocation of funds to the executive branch, which
were then used to fund conferences promoting President Bush's Faith-Based and

73. See id.
74. Id. at 616-17.
75. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997).
76. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
77. See Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito to the Solicitor Gen. of the U.S. (May 30,
available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-891985),
216/Thornburgh-v-ACOG- 1985-box2O-memoAlitotoSolicitorGeneral-May3O.pdf.
78. See NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JUDGE
SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (2005), availableat

http://www.naacpldf.org/contentlpdf/alito/ReportontheNomination-of JudgeSamuel A._A
lito,_Jr, to the SupremeCourt-of theUnitedStates.pdf.
79. See Michiko Kakutani, Books of the Times; CourtNo LongerDivided: Conservativesin
Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2007, availableat
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res--9AOCE7DA1F30F930A1 5752COA9619C8B63.
80. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
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Community Initiative program. 81 The plaintiffs believed that any expenditure of
government funds in violation of the Establishment Clause could be challenged using
taxpayer standing.8 2 However, the plurality of the Court held that because this money
was a general grant from Congress to the executive branch for day-to-day activities, the
case was distinguishable from the facts of Flast v. Cohen.83 While Flastdealt with a
direct grant of money from Congress that was partly used to support religious
schools, 84 the grant in Hein was from Congress to the executive branch, with no

particular mandate.8 5 The executive branch then chose to use the funds to put on
conferences to promote President Bush's Faith-Based and Community Initiative. 86 The
plurality found the distinction between funds granted directly by Congress and funds
used at the discretion of the executive branch important, and based on that distinction,
declined to extend Flast taxpayer standing to the latter situation.
While Hein is not terribly relevant to the Mitchell line of cases, the opinion shed
some light on where the new members of the Court might fall within the ideological
spectrum of the Court. 87 Unlike what many expected, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito did not join with Justices Scalia and Thomas to form a sturdy conservative bloc.
In fact, Scalia, in a blistering concurrence, chastised the plurality (Alito, Roberts, and
Kennedy) for making meaningless distinctions between the facts at hand and Flast
instead of overruling Flastaltogether. 88 The case showed that Roberts and Alito might
be less inclined than Scalia and Thomas to overturn Establishment Clause precedents
and that the ideologies of the new justices may not be as neatly in line with Scalia and
Thomas as some conservatives hoped.89
C. Lower Court Challenges to Programs Under the Faith-BasedInitiative
In lower court decisions made since Mitchell, the courts have indicated that they
will follow the reasoning in O'Connor's concurrence and have used the same factors as
O'Connor to examine whether particular government aid violates the Establishment

81. Id.at2560.
82. Id at 2565. The idea of taxpayer standing comes from Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968). In Flast,the Court held that taxpayers could challenge a congressional expenditure that
was disbursed to schools, including parochial schools, and was expressly mandated by
Congress. Id. at 105-06. The Court allowed a very limited exception that allowed taxpayers to
challenge laws when Congress was using its taxing and spending power in violation of the
Establishment Clause. Id.at 105. The reason behind this is that when a citizen's money is being
used by Congress to support the establishment of a religion or religions, the citizen is entitled to
protest this unconstitutional use of his tax money.
83. Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2566.
84. See Flast,392 U.S. at 85-86.
85. See Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2566.
86. See id. at 2555.
87. Justices Scalia and Thomas fall at the conservative end of the Court's ideological
spectrum, with Kennedy occupying the moderate position, and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Stevens, and Souter at the more liberal end.
88. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2573-74.
89. Robert Marus, Analysis: Courts Only Slightly Less Open to Church-State Suits After
Hein Case, ASSOCIATED BAPTisT PRESS NEWS, June 28, 2007,

http://www.abpnews.com/index.php?option=com-content&taskcview&id=2731&Itemid= 120.
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Clause. Lower federal courts have decided a number of cases dealing with government
funding of religious organizations since the Mitchell decision. These cases make it
clear that O'Connor's opinion is considered the controlling standard for government
funding of religious institutions. 90In both FreedomFromReligion Foundation,Inc. v.
McCallum91 and DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., the courts explicitly
to use the constitutional standard in Justice O'Connor's
announced their intention
92
Mitchell concurrence.
The lower court cases also examine the same factors used in the Mitchell
concurrence when considering whether the primary effect ofa statute or regulation is to
advance religion. We will therefore examine how the lower courts deal with the four
considerations from Mitchell: (1) the divertability of the aid to religious purposes, (2)
whether the aid is supplemental to the core function of the grantee, (3) whether the
organization receiving the aid is pervasively sectarian, and (4) whether the aid fosters
93
excessive entanglement between the government and the religious organization.
1. Divertability of Government Aid to Religious Purposes
Like O'Connor's Mitchell concurrence, lower courts have emphasized preventing
actual diversion of government aid to religious use when considering the
constitutionality of a funding program. In McCallum, the court discussed extensively
the possibility of diversion of money. 94 Recall that, in Mitchell, O'Connor gave the
government a presumption that money was not being diverted to religious use as long
as the government and the religious organization instituted proper safeguards to ensure
that the government grant was not being used for religious purposes.95 Mitchell also
dealt with educational materials, 96 while McCallum dealt with direct monetary grants. 97
Because McCallum dealt with money, which is easier to divert to religious
purposes, and because the government did not institute enough safeguards to ensure the
money was only spent in secular pursuits, the court struck down the grant. 98 The court
found it particularly troubling that the government grants and private donations were
deposited into the same account with no method of separating the government money
for secular purposes. 99 The court did not accept the religious organization's argument

90. E.g., DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 419 (2d Cir. 2001).
91. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 967 (W.D.
Wis. 2002).
92. See DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 419; McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 967. The court in
McCallum actually announced that they would use the test "as prescribed by a majority" of the
Mitchell Court. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 967. The court in McCallum is not entirely clear
on what it means by "majority," but the inference can be drawn that it was referring to
O'Connor's opinion combined with the dissent since the court goes on to use the same factors
(divertability, supplemental/supplanting, and excessive entanglement) that the O'Connor
opinion uses in coming to its decision in Mitchell. See id. at 967-77.
93. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 836-67 (2000).
94. See McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74.
95. See supra Part II.A. 1.
96. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802 (plurality opinion).
97. See McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
98. See id. at 974-75, 982.
99. See id. at 974.
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that because they had enough private money to cover its religious programs, the
government money was only being used for secular purposes.'°° Instead the court held
that without monitoring or separation of the funds, there was no way to tell what the
government money was being spent on.' 0' This case shows that, like O'Connor, lower
courts are concerned with diversion of funds to religious use. It also shows that if the
government neglects to institute proper safeguards to prevent diversion, a court will
presume that funds are being diverted to religious purposes even if the religious
organization can show that it had enough private funding to cover their religious costs.
2. Aid Must Be Supplemental
In line with O'Connor's reasoning in Mitchell, lower courts have not allowed
government funding to supplant costs of religious organizations, while government aid
that supplements religious organizations' existing resources is permitted within the
limits of the Establishment Clause. The key, like in Mitchell, is that the government
02
funds not relieve the religious organization of costs it otherwise would have borne.
In McCallum, the court found that government money was crucial to support the
primary functions of the religious organization and that the government money relieved
the religious organization of costs it otherwise would have bome.' 0 3 The court found
that using government money to supplant costs that should be borne by the religious
organization violates the Establishment Clause. ° 4
3. Religiously Affiliated Versus Pervasively Sectarian
O'Connor's concurrence in Mitchell did not leave the question about pervasively
sectarian organizations receiving direct government aid particularly clear, but at least
one lower court has indicated that the government may not give direct government
money grants to pervasively sectarian organizations. 0 5 In American Civil Liberties
Union v. Foster,the district court went back to Bowen for guidance on how to deal
with direct monetary grants to pervasively sectarian groups. 106 The court indicated that
when government money flows to a pervasively sectarian institution, there is 0 a7
substantial risk that some of that money will be used to further religious objectives.1
While the court also looked at the actual diversion of government funds to religious

100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
103. Seeid.
104. See id.
105. See ACLU v. Foster, No. 02-1440,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13778, at *9 (E.D. La. July
24, 2002) (explaining that direct monetary grants are one indication that the governmental
program has the primary effect of advancing religion). For an explanation of the distinction
between pervasively sectarian institutions and religiously affiliated institutions, see Part H.A.3.
106. See id.
107. See id. (stating that pervasively sectarian institutions should not receive public funding
because "aid... would, knowingly or unknowingly, result in religious indoctrination") (quoting
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 (1988)).
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uses,10 8 it placed a great deal of weight on the fact that government money was being
directly given to a pervasively sectarian institution. '9 This case indicates that at least
one lower court believes that the Supreme Court standard for direct funding still bars
direct monetary grants to pervasively sectarian groups.
4. Excessive Entanglement Between the Government and Religious Organizations
Similar to Justice O'Connor's analysis in Mitchell, lower courts have examined
government grants to religious organizations for excessive entanglement but found no
entanglement problems. In McCallum, the court pointed out that when the government
gives religious organizations money, it has a duty to ensure that the grant is not used to
support religion, so the government must engage in some monitoring." 0 And, as the
court held, "[s]uch monitoring does not necessarily amount to excessive
entanglement.""' Similarly, the court in DeStefano found that the amount of
monitoring needed to ensure that government funds were not used for religious
purposes would not result in excessive entanglement." 2 The lower court opinions thus
make it clear that some amount of monitoring of government grants is not only
constitutionally permissible, but expected.
III. WILL FEMA's REIMBURSEMENT PLAN SURViVE AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
CHALLENGE?

Under the current Supreme Court standard for direct aid to religious organizations,
FEMA's reimbursement plan is likely to fail constitutional scrutiny because of the lack
of safeguards in place to prevent diversion of government funds to religious use. Many
civil libertarian organizations have been highly critical of FEMA's plan to reimburse
religious organizations for their role in hurricane relief. 13 At this point, it is unclear
whether the criticism will translate into an actual constitutional challenge. However,
ignoring strategic' 4 or political reasons"15 to refrain from attacking the
reimbursements, the plan creates some realistic opportunities for constitutional
challenges.
It is therefore worthwhile to consider the potential success of such a challenge. It
will be helpful to first outline FEMA's reimbursement plan for private organizations
that aided in hurricane relief and then consider whether such a plan is constitutional

108. See id.
at *10-*12.
109. See id. at *9.
110. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 967 (W.D.
Wis. 2002).
111. Id.
112. See DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 414 (2d Cir. 2001).
113. See Cooperman & Williamson, supra note 3.
114. Civil libertarian groups may be fearful that the makeup of the new Supreme Court
makes it likely that the new Court will abandon the reasoning of O'Connor's concurrence in
Mitchell and side with the plurality. This would make these groups hesitant to create such an
opportunity for the Court by bringing an Establishment Clause challenge.
115. It would be a politically unpopular move to challenge reimbursements to religious
organizations that performed so admirably in the wake of the hurricanes.
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under the relevant precedents. This Part will first outline FEMA's reimbursement plan
and then move on to examine whether the plan will survive constitutional scrutiny
under the current Supreme Court doctrine.
A. An Outline of FEMA 's Reimbursement Plan
The reimbursement plan created by FEMA notably lacks any real guidance or
limitations on how the government funds can be used aside from ensuring the items
reimbursed are secular, and will therefore run into problems with the actual diversion
part of O'Connor's test from Mitchell.1 6 Congress granted the funds for the
reimbursement to the executive branch in a series of appropriations designed to deal
with hurricane relief.17 The appropriations contained no relevant Establishment Clause
limitations on how the executive branch could spend the funds," 8 so it is not very
helpful in elaborating on guidelines for reimbursements. FEMA then decided to use
some of this grant money to reimburse private organizations, including religious
institutions that helped with relief efforts. 119 Applicants for reimbursements are
required to document their costs and submit reimbursement requests to local and state
emergency agencies, which will then seek funds from FEMA. 120 In looking at the
FEMA plan, this Subpart will break the plan down into (1) the guidelines given by
FEMA to local administrators and religious organizations and (2) the monitoring
system FEMA has in place to ensure these guidelines are followed.
1. Guidelines
FEMA did outline which costs would be reimbursed in an internal memorandum
entitled "Eligible Costs for Emergency Sheltering Declarations."' 21 Eligible costs
included essential assistance like housing, medical care, food, water, and other
necessities. 122 In deciding whether the documented costs are to be reimbursed,
FEMA
123
officials are supposed to follow guidelines outlined in the Stafford Act.

116. See supraPart II.A. 1.

117. E.g., Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2745 (2005).
118. For example, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the
Gulf of Mexico and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 contained no such Establishment Clause
limitation. See id.
119. See Cooperman & Williamson, supranote 3. FEMA initially indicated that only groups
that were asked by the government to aid would be reimbursed. Id. It has since backed away
from this position and will grant reimbursements to organizations even ifthey were not asked to
aid. Anne Farris & Claire Hughes, FEMA Official Clarifies FederalHurricaneAid to FaithBased Groups, ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION & SOC. WELFARE POL'Y, Oct. 4, 2005,
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/articleprint.cfn?id=3305.
120. See Memorandum from Nancy Ward, Dir. of FEMA Recovery Area Command, to
FEMA Pub. Assistance Staff (Sept. 9, 2005), availableat
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/policy/FEMA reimbursement-memoSept/ 2092005.pdf [hereinafter Ward Memorandum].
121. Cooperman & Williamson, supra note 3.
122. Ward Memorandum, supranote 120, at 2.
123. See id.
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The Stafford Act is a statute dealing with disaster response, and it has a general
prohibition against discrimination as a prerequisite to receiving government aid.124 The
general discrimination prohibition is not terribly helpful, but the statute goes on to say
that organizations receiving government aid must comply with all "regulations relating
to nondiscrimination promulgated by the President."' 125 This is potentially more helpful
because President Bush announced in an executive order some actual substantive
Establishment Clause guidelines for private organizations receiving government
funds. 126 Bush's order explained that organizations that receive federal financial aid
must not make aid contingent on participation in religious practices and must offer
inherently religious activities separately from federally-funded activities.' 27 Ifadopted
into FEMA's guidelines to its administrators, the Stafford Act and Bush's executive
order could help avoid some Establishment Clause problems.
FEMA's memoranda, however, provide no detail about any Establishment Clause
guidelines for state and local officials responsible for making and monitoring payments
to private non-profit organizations.128 The current guidelines only explain what types of
costs are reimbursable. 129 They leave open the possibility that organizations will be
reimbursed for secular materials diverted to religious purposes, religious counseling
even repairs and improvements on facilities used for religious
services, and
3
purposes.1

0

124. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2000) ("[R]elief... activities [funded by the government] shall be
accomplished.., without discrimination on the grounds of... religion...
125. Id.§ 5151(b).
126. See Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 12, 2002).
All organizations that receive Federal financial assistance under social services
programs should be prohibited from discriminating against beneficiaries or
potential beneficiaries of the social services programs on the basis of religion or
religious belief. Accordingly, organizations, in providing services supported in
whole or in part with Federal financial assistance, and in their outreach activities
related to such services, should not be allowed to discriminate against current or
prospective program beneficiaries on the basis of religion, a religious belief, a
refusal to hold a religious belief, or a refusal to actively participate in a religious
practice.
Id. In addition,
[O]rganizations that engage in inherently religious activities, such as worship,
religious instruction, and proselytization, must offer those services separately in
time or location from any programs or services supported with direct Federal
financial assistance, and participation in any such inherently religious activities
must be voluntary for the beneficiaries of the social service program supported
with such Federal financial assistance

Id.
127. See id.
128. See IRA C. LuPu &

ROBERT W. TUTrLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2005-LEGAL

DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS
ORGANIZATIONS 23 (2005),

BETWEEN GOVERNMENT

AND FAITH-BASED

http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/reports/State-of theLaw_2005.pdf.
129. See Ward Memorandum, supra note 120, at 2-6.
130. See LuPu & TUTrLE, supra note 128, at 22-24.
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2. Monitoring
Aside from the lack of guidelines, the nature of retrospective grants makes it
impossible to tell exactly how the money was spent.' 31 FEMA does require
organizations to "provide a written assurance of their intent to comply with regulations
relating to nondiscrimination" before they receive government funds. 132 Aside from the
written assurance, officials trying to decide which aid can be reimbursed can only look
at the documented costs to monitor how the money was spent. 33 Therefore, the
monitoring system can ensure only that religious organizations promise that the
reimbursements were not used for religious purposes and that the reimbursements go to
cover expenditures of a secular character. Essentially, FEMA's only monitoring system
of the reimbursements is to check receipts to make sure that the costs reimbursed are
on the list of reimbursable costs. There is no plan beyond that to ensure that religious
organizations are not using the reimbursement checks to fund religious activities or
rebuild religious structures.
B. A ConstitutionalChallenge
The current FEMA reimbursement plan would likely not survive an Establishment
Clause challenge under the Supreme Court's current standard for direct government
grants to religious organizations because it lacks the proper safeguards to ensure that
government funds are not diverted to religious use and because the Supreme Court has
yet to allow monetary grants to be given directly to pervasively sectarian organizations.
Brian C. Ryckman has previously addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the
reimbursement plan,' 34 but this Part will explain why this Note comes to a different
conclusion about whether FEMA's plan will pass constitutional scrutiny. While
Ryckman is probably correct that the political environment surrounding hurricane
relief makes a constitutional challenge unlikely, this Part will explain the flaws in his
analysis and subsequent conclusion that the program does not violate the Establishment
Clause.
It is important to evaluate the constitutionality of the program even if a challenge is
unlikely. FEMA should strive to create a disaster relief strategy that complies with the
Establishment Clause because, as a government agency, it has a duty to uphold the
Constitution. Furthermore, Hurricane Katrina is not the last disaster that FEMA will
face. Unfortunately, there will be more disasters in the future and more opportunities
for constitutional challenges if FEMA continues to promulgate a program that violates
the Establishment Clause.
Because O'Connor's concurring opinion in Mitchell remains controlling, FEMA's
current reimbursement plan would not survive a constitutional challenge. Using the
framework given by the Supreme Court in Mitchell and used by lower courts in
examining direct government aid programs, it is clear that the reimbursement plan is

131. Seeid. at26.

132. 44 C.F.R. § 206.11(c) (2007).
133. See Ward Memorandum, supra note 120, at 2 (listing the categories of eligible
expenses).
134. See Ryckman, supra note 4, at 948-50 (discussing how FEMA's reimbursement
program will withstand constitutional challenges on Establishment Clause grounds).
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constitutionally flawed. It will be helpful to systematically examine the plan using the
Mitchell framework: (1) the divertability of the aid to religious purposes, (2) whether
the aid was supplemental to the core function of the grantee, (3) whether the
organization receiving the aid is pervasively sectarian, and (4) whether the aid fosters
excessive entanglement between the government and the religious organization.' 35
1. Divertability of Government Aid to Religious Purposes
The FEMA reimbursement plan has few safeguards and almost no monitoring to
ensure that money is not diverted for religious purposes and would therefore fail an
Establishment Clause challenge. O'Connor's concurring opinion in Mitchell places the
136
burden on plaintiffs to show that government aid was used for religious purposes.
However, O'Connor also scrutinized the safeguards in place to prevent divertability
and ensure that there were not extensive Establishment Clause violations."' Like
O'Connor, courts will scrutinize the safeguards implemented by FEMA to avoid
diversion, and, unlike the program in Mitchell, the reimbursement safeguards are
constitutionally insufficient.
The only clear safeguard contained in FEMA's guidelines is the requirement that
certain costs like debris removal and long term housing cannot be reimbursed.1 38 The
memo also outlines some costs that may be reimbursed, but does not limit
reimbursement to those listed costs. 13 9 The guidelines also refer to Section 502 of the
Stafford Act, which could provide more guidance as explained above.' 4 The Stafford
Act has a broad prohibition against discrimination, but mentions nothing about
conditioning aid on participation in religious services' 14 or proselytizing while aid is
disbursed. However, this is a fairly complex and obscure reference, and it would be a
far better safeguard against misuse of government funds ifthe guidelines distributed by
FEMA were more explicit about the prohibited uses of government funds. Currently,
there is no safeguard against the possibility that reimbursable aid was distributed in a
manner completely inconsistent with the Mitchell rule that direct government aid not be
diverted to religious use. For example, some religious groups proselytized or handed
out Bibles when they were distributing aid.142 Under the FEMA guidelines, this would
not be problematic, but under the Mitchell precedent, this would be unconstitutional.
In addition to the lack of safeguards for FEMA reimbursements, the FEMA plan has
no system of monitoring to ensure that religious organizations did not violate the
Establishment Clause when distributing aid. The monitoring problem is not limited to
the FEMA plan. Any time the government makes retrospective payments to religious
organizations, it loses the ability to monitor how that money is spent. 4 3 It is a fairly
obvious point that the government has no means of monitoring the distribution of

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 836-67 (2000).
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 861-62 (reviewing the safeguards in place to prevent actual diversion).
See Ward Memorandum, supra note 120, at 6.
See id. at 2-5.
See supra Part III.A. 1.
See LUPU & TUTrLE, supra note 128, at 23.
See Cooperman & Williamson, supra note 3.

143. See Luiu & TuTrLE, supra note 128, at 26.
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money that has already been spent. Because of this, the government has no way to
know whether secular aid was distributed in a manner that is inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause.'44 Even if FEMA asked for a guarantee that money was not
spent in violation (which it does not under the guidelines),145 any religious organization
could lie about how they spent the money and it would be very difficult to refute,
because the events are all in the past. While O'Connor presumed good faith of
religious organizations in Mitchell, she also thoroughly reviewed the safeguards to
determine their adequacy.146 A good faith presumption will not save a program that has
no substantial safeguards in place. This problem of monitoring, along with the
inadequate safeguards promulgated by FEMA, would doom the reimbursement plan if
there were a constitutional challenge based on Mitchell.
2. Aid Must Be Supplemental
The FEMA reimbursement plan does a better job of ensuring that reimbursements
will not supplant costs of the religious organizations, but there are a few problem areas
like reimbursements for religious organizations' employee salaries or repairs to
religious structures. The FEMA plan largely limits reimbursements to items that are
unquestionably supplemental like essential aid supplies, medical care, and
transportation of evacuees. 47 However, the plan also allows for some labor costs to be
reimbursed, 148 and some of those employees might have a dual religious and secular
purpose, thereby creating an Establishment Clause issue. A specific issue would be
reimbursement of counseling expenses, 149 because some of the counseling might
contain elements of religious proselytizing. McCallum, a district court case, explicitly
ruled that using government funds on counseling
that combined religious and secular
50
messages violated the Establishment Clause.1
There also might be a problem with allowing facility expenses to be reimbursed.
When a facility has dual religious and secular purposes, it is hard to separate which
expenses the reimbursement is going towards.151 There is also a danger that facility
funds will be used to make improvements to religious facilities as opposed to just
restoring the facility to its pre-disaster state, as required by the FEMA guidelines.
While these concerns with the supplemental aid plan are present and should not be
overlooked, overall the FEMA plan directs reimbursements toward supplemental aid
services and not costs that would supplant normal operating expenses of religious
organizations.

144. See id.
145. See Ward Memorandum, supra note 120.
146. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 861-62 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. See Ward Memorandum, supra note 120, at 2-3.
148. See id. at 2.
149. See id. at 3.
150. See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950,969-970
(W.D. Wis. 2002).
151. See LuPu &TutrrLE, supra note 128, at 24.
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3. Religiously Affiliated Versus Pervasively Sectarian
Another issue that may be problematic for the FEMA reimbursement plan is that it
gives direct cash grants to pervasively sectarian organizations, which appears to violate
Establishment Clause precedent even though O'Connor was relatively silent about the
issue in her Mitchell concurrence. By a FEMA official's own admission, the
reimbursements will be available to pervasively sectarian organizations like
churches.15 2 Even though Agostini did not deal with direct cash grants to pervasively
sectarian groups, the Court did say that it was important that no government money
ended up in the coffers of a pervasively sectarian organization.153 O'Connor was silent
on the issue in Mitchell, but even the plurality acknowledged that there were "'special
Establishment Clause dangers' when money is given to [pervasively sectarian
organizations] directly."' 4
More on point though, is the district court case ofACLUv. Foster,which held that
direct monetary aid could not flow from the government to pervasively sectarian
institutions.155 This case is more on point because it deals with money as opposed to
educational materials or remedial education teachers, as in Mitchell and Agostini. It is
also an important case in the context of Hurricane Katrina because New Orleans is in
the jurisdiction of the Eastern District of Louisiana,156 so many, ifnot all, Katrina cases
go through that court. That court held that when money is given directly to pervasively
sectarian organizations, the risk is too great that the money will be diverted to religious
purposes.' 57 While Supreme Court precedent is not entirely clear on this issue, the
Supreme Court has yet to approve direct cash grants to pervasively sectarian groups,
and the practice is clearly still disfavored in lower courts. This is another pitfall of the
FEMA reimbursement plan that should be addressed.
4. Excessive Entanglement Between the Government and Religious Organizations
The FEMA reimbursement plan will not have any problems with excessive
entanglement because the plan crafted by FEMA has even less monitoring and
administration in place than other plans approved in Mitchell, Agostini, and Bowen.
Routine administration and monitoring of a government aid program is not only
constitutionally permissible but is a key element of ensuring that government aid is not
59
diverted to religious use.' 58 The monitoring plans approved in Agostini and Bowen

152. See Farris & Hughes, supra note 119.
153. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228 (1997).
154. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 818-19 (2000) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)) (emphasis in
original).
155. ACLU v. Foster, No. 02-1440,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13778, at *22 (E.D. La.July24,
2002).
156. United States Court Locator, http://216.152.235.70/webdir.fwx (choose "district court"

under number 1 and "city and state" under number 2; then type in New Orleans and select the
state of Louisiana; then click "search").
157. See Foster,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13778, at *9 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 612 (1988)).
158. See supra Part II.A.4.
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were both much more comprehensive than the relatively limited monitoring in the
FEMA plan. The FEMA monitoring plan, as discussed above, 60 appears to only
require that government officials check the receipts of religious organizations to make
sure that they are asking for properly reimbursable costs. 161 Beyond that, there is really

no monitoring system in place to ensure that money is not being diverted to religious
purposes. 162 While this causes problems in other areas of Establishment Clause
inquiry, 163 it makes the excessive entanglement inquiry easier by creating a very low
level of government involvement in the operations of the religious organizations.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROVIDING THE MOST EFFECTIVE DISASTER RESPONSE
PLAN WHILE FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRINCIPLES

FEMA's reimbursement plan is constitutionally problematic and an ineffective way
to coordinate the relief effort, so FEMA should work to create an emergency grant
system that allocates funds to private groups in times of emergency, but also places
enough safeguards to ensure that the money is used only for secular purposes. FEMA's
two primary concerns in providing disaster relief should be (1) effectiveness and (2)
constitutionality. The reimbursement system is clearly not the best way to deal with
either concern. As outlined above, asking religious organizations to help with the relief
effort without any funding or supplies inhibits these organizations' ability to provide
the optimal hurricane relief. 164 Also, the lack of an ability to monitor whether aid was
diverted to religious purposes makes the reimbursement plan constitutionally
unappealing.165 It is therefore worthwhile to consider some possible alternatives to the
reimbursement plan.
Two of the best options are instituting a voucher system and giving government
grants that include constitutional safeguards. The voucher system would ensure that
federal money passes through individual citizens to religious organizations and other
disaster response groups in exchange for emergency relief. This plan is appealing
because indirect grants create far fewer constitutional problems, but it is inefficient and
ineffective for dealing with immediate emergency situations. Another option is to give
prospective grants that have more guidelines and monitoring in place to avoid
Establishment Clause problems. This plan is appealing because it allows the
organizations receiving the funding to be more effective, but it requires more energy
and resources to ensure that there are no constitutional abuses.

159. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (finding that because there was no
longer a presumption that school teachers would be unable to faithfully execute their
constitutional duties in a pervasively sectarian setting, there was no need for pervasive
monitoring of the teachers and, therefore, that the level of monitoring needed was acceptable
under excessive entanglement inquiry); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616-17 (1988)
(approving a monitoring system where government officials would review the programs set up
by religious organizations and visit the organizations to make sure the programs were being
carried out according to constitutional requirements).
160. See supra Part 11I.B.1.
161. See Ward Memorandum, supra note 120, at 2.
162. Id.

163. See supraPart III.B.I.
164. See supraPart I.
165. See supra Part III.A.2.
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A. Institutinga Voucher System
In his comment on FEMA's reimbursement plan, Brian C. Ryckman suggests that
FEMA institute a voucher program for future disasters. 66 Ryckman does little to
elaborate on the proposal, but it appears that he wants essential services like housing,
medical aid, food, water, and clothing to be provided for through vouchers., 67 In
proposing the voucher program, Ryckman focuses on preventing future Establishment
Clause challenges,168 but fails to properly estimate the practicality of such a solution in
disaster scenarios.
Constitutionally speaking, vouchers are indeed an appealing way to deal with
Establishment Clause issues. Under the Mitchell precedent, a majority of the Court
would allow government money to be used to support even religious activities as long
as the money was neutrally available to religious and secular organizations alike, 169 and
it was given to the individual citizen first, who then made a true private choice to
receive aid from a religious organization. 70 FEMA would then not have to worry about
how the religious organization used the money from the voucher.
Where Ryckman's proposal runs into problems, however, is in considering the
effectiveness of such a plan. The Red Cross and FEMA distributed vouchers in the
wake of the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for everything from meals' 7 1 to permanent
housing.172 However, voucher dispersal stations were overwhelmed by crowds and had
to call in the National Guard. 73 The Red Cross even admitted that the voucher system
74
is not always viable for larger disasters since there is so much paperwork involved.
Vouchers might be useful for long-term relief efforts, 17 5 once the situation has
stabilized. However, in short-term relief situations, they are an ineffective and
burdensome way to distribute aid.

166. See Ryckman, supra note 4, at 950.
167. See id. This is inferred from his proposal that vouchers "replace" reimbursements. Since
these are the types of things religious organizations can be reimbursed for, it is reasonable to
suspect that Ryckman wants the vouchers to be for the same types of goods.
168. Id. at951.
169. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 838 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 841-42.
171. COMMC'N & MKTG. DEP'T, AM. RED CROSS, WE CAN'T Do IT WITHOUT You: 2005
ANNUAL REPORT

3 (2005),

http://www.redcross.org/www-files/Documents/pdf/corppubs/AnnualReport.PDF (discussing a
family who was set up in a motel room with new clothes and meal vouchers after the hurricane).
172. See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 315.
173. Id. at 348.
174. AM. RED

CROSS, FROM CHALLENGE TO ACTION: AMERICAN RED CROSS ACTIONS TO

IMPROVE AND ENHANCE ITS DISASTER RESPONSE AND RELATED CAPABILITIES FOR THE

2006

HURRICANE SEASON AND BEYOND 10 (2006),

http://www.redcross.org/www-files/Documents/pdf/corppubs/file-cont5448_langO.2006.pdf.
175. See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 315 (explaining why vouchers were an
effective means of providing permanent housing assistance to disaster victims).
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B. Grants with Clear Guidelines andMonitoring
Once incorporated into the disaster response structure, religious organizations will
need guidelines about proper spending. With the precedent of Mitchell in mind, FEMA
should craft standards that will help grants avoid and survive constitutional challenges.
Guidelines like the ones articulated in the Section on reimbursements' 76 would help
religious organizations understand how government funds could be used without
violating the Establishment Clause.
Admittedly, it would be difficult to define permissible and impermissible activities.
Would religious organizations be allowed to say a prayer when serving governmentfunded food? The question raises the specter of Establishment Clause problems
running into Free Exercise issues. However, as long as FEMA makes it clear what kind
of strings are attached to the government aid, it is free to articulate guidelines, as long
1 77
as it does not violate the constitutional rights of those groups being excluded.
Excluding sectarian groups may create other problems with the Establishment Clause
because groups could argue that FEMA is favoring non-sectarian groups178 over
sectarian groups, so FEMA should be cautious in excluding any groups from the
funding program unless the group refuses to comply with the guidelines promulgated
by FEMA.
Once guidelines are in place, it is important that government officials monitor
religious organizations for compliance. Although resources may limit the ability of
government agencies to monitor charities for compliance, 179 these agencies should
conduct site visits as often as possible to ensure that compliance standards are met.
Monitoring of this sort has not been considered an "excessive entanglement" problem
by Supreme Court decisions.' 80 Violators should be warned of Establishment Clause
deficiencies, and monitored more closely. If they continue the violations, government
funding should be revoked.
A recent study conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) shows
the importance of monitoring and having clear guidelines when the government grants
money to religious organizations. In reviewing other government grants to religious
groups through the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
(WHOFBCI), the GAO found that monitoring systems were inadequate to ensure that
religious organizations were using grant money properly.'18 Even with guidelines in

176. See supra Part III.B.
177. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) ("[Wlhen the Government appropriates
public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.").
178. Nonsectarian is defined as "not restricted to or dominated by a particular religious
group." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1538 (Phillip Babcock Grove ed.,

1981).
179. See U.S. GOV'T AccoUNTAILITY

OFFICE, GAO 06-616, FArrH-BASED AND COMMUNITY
INITIATIVE: IMPROVEMENTS IN MONITORING GRANTEES AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE COULD

ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY 36-37 (2006), availableat
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06616.pdf [hereinafter

FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNIr

INmATIE].

180. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,234 (1997) (finding unannounced monthly
visits by public supervisors to fall far short of excessive entanglement).
181. See FAITH-BAsED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVE, supra note 179, at 36-39.
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place, some local administrators and religious organizations receiving the money did
not have a clear understanding of the applicable constitutional law. 182 When guidelines
left room for misinterpretation, and monitoring was weak or non-existent, the GAO
often found that religious organizations receiving
government grants operated under
83
mistaken assumptions about constitutional law.'
The GAO report indicates that clear and complete guidelines, in tandem with
serious monitoring procedures, are the best way to ensure that religious organizations
fully understand the constitutional requirements attached to government funding.
Although resources may limit the ability of government agencies to monitor charities
for compliance,' 4 these agencies should aim to communicate openly with religious
organizations to ensure they are aware of restrictions on grant money expenditures and
conduct site visits as often as necessary to ensure that compliance standards are met.
Religious organizations that are involved in activities that create a high potential for
Establishment Clause violations or who resist guidelines should be monitored more
closely. Violators should be punished with sanctions or, if necessary, revocation of
grants.
There are some admitted problems with a monitoring system. It takes more
administrative work and money to monitor aid than vouchers, which require no postgrant monitoring. Also, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, monitoring may take a
back seat to relief efforts. However, as the situation normalizes, monitoring should
increase to ensure that organizations are complying with Establishment Clause
standards. Monitoring for Establishment Clause violations is important, but when an
area is in a state of emergency, an exception can be made until rule of law is
reestablished. 185
While there are more Establishment Clause issues to deal with in a grant program
(as opposed to a voucher program), the grant program far outstrips the voucher
program in effectiveness. FEMA can avoid constitutional violations in grant programs
with proper guidelines and monitoring. Also, with a grant program, religious
organizations that have agreed to be part of a hurricane relief infrastructure could
create a hurricane relief account, separate from their private funding, strictly for
government aid.186 FEMA could then direct funds to the organizations as soon as the
disaster hits. Unlike vouchers, 187 this would allow local religious organizations, with
their first-hand knowledge of the needs of the community, to quickly try to meet those
needs. FEMA could also supply these organizations with relief materials as requested
by the organizations. Either system gets aid to religious organizations that know the
needs of the community more quickly than a voucher system.

182. Seeid. at39.
183. Id.
184. Seeid. at36-37.
185. A state of emergency exception to the Establishment Clause is worth considering for its
practical value in disaster response scenarios, however, space limitations do not allow for a full
discussion of such an exception.
186. This would probably satisfy a constitutional challenge because Justice O'Connor's fear
is diversion and separation of government aid from religious activities. See Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 861 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
187. Vouchers merely place another logistical step in the way of people who need aid. They
first have to obtain a voucher, then go to receive actual aid.
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There will be critics who point out that the assumption that religious organizations
need to be incorporated into disaster response is flawed. There are groups that believe
that there should be a wall between church and state no matter the circumstances.
Setting up a system where the government funds and works together with religious
groups will be highly unsatisfactory to such strict separationists. However, the Supreme
Court has shown a willingness to allow interaction between the government and
religious organizations as long as it does not appear that the government is promoting
religion. Disaster response presents a scenario in which the government needs to utilize
all available resources to deal with a massive and immediate problem. Requiring
religious groups and the government to work separately and inefficiently just to
maintain a solid wall of separation between church and state would be misguided. In an
attempt to protect citizens' constitutional rights, strict separationists would prevent
necessary aid from reaching those ravaged communities and citizens.
CONCLUSION

With the primary goal of saving and repairing lives in the wake of a disaster, the
government needs to find a way to provide the best relief effort possible while
respecting Establishment Clause principles. There are a number of different options to
consider in attaining this goal. FEMA's current reimbursement program is fraught with
constitutional problems and is not the best way to provide relief in a time of disaster.
While constitutional principles are important, human life is more valuable, and so
FEMA should set up the best possible hurricane response network. This network
should include religious organizations because they are an integral part ofthe hurricane
response and will function more effectively if they are coordinated with government
agencies. A coordinated system incorporating local non-profits (including religious
organizations) ensures the most effective response, and government grants to local
groups with guidelines and monitoring in place to ensure compliance is the best means
of achieving this end.

